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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS, AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
In Succession of Gomez' the testator had bequeathed her dis-
posable portion and hence it became necessary to find what the
portion of her forced heirs was in order to determine the balance
representing her disposable portion. Contest was over the deter-
mination of the forced amount under the reduction article of the
Code. The executrix computed the aggregate after all debts
were paid and then fictitiously added all gifts inter vivos. Since
there were three branches of forced heirs, two-thirds of this
sum composed the forced amount leaving one-third disposable.
The Supreme Court agreed that this was correct. The con-
testants argued that article 1505 applied only when a suit for re-
duction was filed or on demand for a forced share. Their posi-
tion was that the computation should be upon the net estate at
time of death. The question appears to have been new in Lou-
isiana but much authority was found to support the opponent's
contention in the French law. However, it was discovered that,
due apparently to the influence of the French commentators,
the courts of France had in 1826 reversed their position and
since that date had maintained the position taken by the execu-
trix on computation under article 1505. Obviously, gifts inter
vivos were to be debited against the forced share of each heir.
Much emphasis was properly laid upon the fictitious adding of
gifts inter vivos as distinguished from actual collation, dealt
with in article 1235 which forbids suit for collation by legatees
or creditors of the succession. An attorney's fee of $25,000 was
allowed which the court thought might be too high for an estate
of $270,000 under ordinary circumstances, but seemed reason-
able when the many and unusual services were considered.
The decision seems eminently correct and is based upon a
most scholarly thesis. This case together with the Gomez case2
dealing with collation of manual gifts represents one of the
greatest jurisprudential contributions of recent years.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 1092, 78 So.2d 411 (1955).
2. 223 La. 859, 67 So.2d 156 (1953).
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In Succession of Gaines3 the legitimacy of certain persons
was proved by competent evidence and they were declared to
be the sole heirs of their deceased father and grandfather. Pre-
sumption of legitimacy was stressed. In the instant case, Succes-
sion of Jackson,4 which was consolidated with the Gaines case,
these heirs were permitted to share in their ancestor's portion
of his mother's estate.
In Succession of Senkpiel,5 the public administrator applied
to sell certain property at private sale6 as it would be of material
advantage to the succession. Opposition was filed by a realty
company which wished to buy the property. The court held that
this company, being neither a creditor, heir, nor legatee, had no
interest and could not oppose the sale.
In Sharp v. Sharp,7 plaintiffs, brothers and sisters of de-
ceased, brought suit to have the widow of their brother declared
unworthy to inherit his half of the community because she had
murdered her husband." An exception of no cause of action was
entered since the widow had not been convicted of the murder
and indeed the investigating grand jury had returned a "no true
bill." The exception was sustained below and judgment was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court. The case also presented certain
procedural problems which are commented upon elsewhere in this
Symposium.9
DONATIONS
Donations - Inter Vivos
In Davis v. Radoste0 suit was brought in forma pauperis by
an old lady past seventy in failing health to collect a judgment
against a young man, a grocery clerk, for almost $25,000 plus
some of her silver and jewelry, of which he had allegedly man-
aged to gain possession. There was a great deal of more or less
conflicting evidence and several shifts of position by the de-
fendant. After careful review the court affirmed the decision
of the trial court declaring the transactions to have been gifts
3. 227 La. 318, 79 So.2d :322 (1955).
4. 227 La. 327, 79 So.2d 326 (1955).
5. 227 La. 516, 79 So.2d 866 (1955).
6. La. Acts 1938, No. 290, p. 757.
7. 228 La. 89, 81 So.2d 820 (1955).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 966 (1870).
9. See pages 362, 380 infra.
10. 226 La. 160, 75 So.2d 230 (1954).
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of all of the plaintiff's goods and hence null in their entirety
under article 1497 of the Civil Code.
In Miller v. Miller" forced heirs sued to annul a mortgage
made by their deceased father. Their stepmother, sister of the
mortgagee, was a joint defendant. She was executor of the de-
cedent's estate. The grounds for the action were that the con-
tract was simulated with intent to defraud forced heirs.12 The
lower court annulled the contract, but had received over objec-
tion an affidavit of the deceased and his oral declarations that
the mortgage was false. The court reversed the judgment on the
ground that this evidence was hearsay and did not come within
the exceptions of "dying declarations, statements against inter-
est, and in rare instances [declarations] pertaining to family his-
tory, relationship and pedigree."' 13 The court remarked that the
"circumstances of the case might be somewhat suspicious" but
that "lawsuits cannot be decided on speculation.'
4
In Stevens v. Stevens 15 a mother sold immovable property
to her son, the consideration being proved to have been less than
one-fourth of its value. This sale was held null under article
2444 of the Civil Code and the property brought back into the
mother's succession.
In Dietz v. Dietz"6 sales of immovable property by a mother
to two of her sons were attacked by other forced heirs of the
vendor as being simulated under Civil Code article 2239 or as
being donations in disguise under Civil Code article 2444. No
direct proof being available, circumstantial evidence was relied
upon, the burden being carried by the attacker. In the sale to one
son, it was shown that the mother continued to exercise control
as formerly, and hence the presumption of simulation under
article 2480 arose and was not rebutted. In the sale to the other
son, this presumption did not exist; but proof of genuineness
was insufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
Fearing that justice would not be done, however, if defendants
were not allowed to adduce evidence which seemed to be avail-
able to them but not brought forward, the case was remanded.
11. 226 La. 273, 76 So.2d 3 (1954).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2239 (1870).
13. 226 La. 273, 276, 76 So.2d 3, 4 (1954).
14. Id. at 278, 76 So.2d at 4.
15. 227 La. 761, 80 So.2d 399 (1955).
16. 227 La. 801, 80 So.2d 414 (1955).
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The court expressed disagreement with expressions in the juris-
prudence to the effect that the law did not favor actions of this
nature by forced heirs and cited article 20 of the Civil Code
forbidding distinction between "favored" and "odious" laws
when construing meaning.
Donations - Mortis causa
In Lebleu v. Manning" is recorded a second attempt to
nullify a will.' 8 The grounds urged were that the testator could
not read and write with comprehension and that the olographic
will, valid in form, was a mere mechanical copy of a draft made
by the universal legatee at the request of the decedent. The evi-
dence did not support this contention. Well-settled policies were
reiterated: that the will must be supported if possible; that
validity and capacity are presumed and may be rebutted only by
strong evidence; that the findings of the trial judge are heavily
relied upon.
In Succession of Koerkei' 9 an attack was made upon a will.
The form of the testament was nuncupative by public act.20 The
grounds for invalidation boiled down to incompetency of the
attesting witnesses, of whom there were four. One was clearly
incompetent as he was proved not to have been "residing in the
place" as required by article 1578 where the will was executed.
But since three competent witnesses are sufficient, the will was
still sustainable if the remaining witness were determined to be
competent. One was clearly so. The evidence of a second to the
effect that a signature was not his was so weak as to be dis-
regarded. The attack on the competency of the third witness
was that he was insane. Proof of his interdiction was advanced,
with no cause for it indicated. The court noted that article 422
provides for interdiction for "any infirmity" rendering the per-
son incapable of caring for himself and his property. Thus, the
witness may have been interdicted for reasons other than "in-
sanity," listed as a grounds of an incompetency by article 1591,
which does not mention interdiction. The judgment of the lower
court declaring the will invalid was reversed. The contest was
between the widow claiming the whole estate, it being all com-
17. 225 La. 1087, 74 So.2d 384 (1954).
18. See Succession of Pujol v. Manning, 221 La. 466, 59 So.2d 450 (1952).
19. 226 La. 560, 76 So.2d 730 (1954).
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1578 (1870).
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munity property, and the nearest blood relative of the deceased,
a beneficiary under the will.
In Succession of Trahant21 the testator attempted to disin-
herit his daughter for marrying while a minor without his con-
sent. The trial court decided that the deceased had failed to dis-
inherit because of condonation. What comprised the condonation
does not appear; the testator left his property about equally be-
tween his son and a sister-in-law. The court reduced both legacies
on a pro rata basis under article 1502 and 1511 while maintain-
ing the testator's intention as it interpreted it under article 1712.
In Succession of Davis v. Richardson2 2 an attack grounded
upon mental incapacity of the testator was made upon a testa-
ment in nuncupative form by public act. The notary had stated
that the testator had made her mark instead of signing the will
as "she was unable to sign due to her physical condition." Con-
testants urged that the word "cause" in article 1579 intended
that a specific disability should be mentioned by the notary and
that mere "physical condition" was insufficient. The judge below
stated that Supreme Court decisions had made it clear that a
physical condition was the intent of the article, since a mental
condition sufficient to disable a testator from signing would
render him incapable of making a will at all. The trial judge
expressed the view that a detailed explanation of the physical
condition would be more desirable but that the article did not
call for it. His judgment sustaining the validity of the will was
affirmed. The Supreme Court's opinion observed that there
could be no doubt about the physical condition of the testatrix
since she died two days after making the will. Moreover, the nun-
cupative will by public act is proof in itself and "parol testimony
is not admissible to supply any essential requirement not con-
tained in the will." -3 The requirements of article 1579 were con-
tained under this eminently proper interpretation.
In Succession of Ruxton2 a testator left a bequest to a cer-
tain person if she were not married at the time of his death. If
she were married, he directed that the sum be added to the
residue of his estate, disposed of in another paragraph of his
will. The lady had married prior to the testator's death but op-
21. 226 La. 653, 76 So.2d 919 (1954).
22. 226 La. 887, 77 So.2d 524 (1955).
23. Id. at 890, 77 So.2d at 525.
24. 226 La. 1088, 78 So.2d 183 (1955).
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posed the account of the executor filed in accordance with the
testament. She maintained that the condition was against public
policy and hence should be reputed, not written, under article
1519 of the Civil Code. The court found that the lady could not
have been deterred as she did not know of the bequest before the
death of the testator. Moreover, if the condition were against
public policy, which was not decided, it was not against good
morals. The bequest in question was not one "forbidding the
donee to marry during her lifetime or even for a fixed period of
time, nor one that directs the legacy shall lapse in the future,
but rather one that is conditioned upon her status at the time of
the testator's death. ' ' 25 It mattered not what the testator's mo-
tive was, whether based on whim, caprice or otherwise, as he had
a right to dispose of his property as he saw fit unless prohibited
by law.
In Stephens v. Adger 26 a nuncupative will by private act was
in question. As to whether articles 1581 and 1582 had been com-
plied with was a matter of fact. It was found that the will was
read by one of the witnesses to the others in the presence of the
testator. The uncertainty of evidence as to which witnes read it
was immaterial for there is no legal requirement regarding that
item. Likewise, no provision requires that the witnesses sign in
the presence of each other. The court observed that the "ten-
dency of our present day jurisprudence does not exact an abso-
lute ... literal application" 27 of prescribed formalities and that
they should not be "pushed to extremes." These statements were
qualified, of course, by a further expression that in cases of
palpable violation, the court would be forced to strike the testa-
ment even if injustice would appear to result. The will was up-
held as contestants were unable to sustain their burden of proof
that there had not been substantial compliance with the statu-
tory requirements.
In Roumain v. Moody28 the testamentary incapacity of the
deceased not having been proven in the lower court, appeal was
taken on rulings of the judge refusing to permit cross-examina-
tion of "particular agents" of the testatrix, 9 or exhumation of
her body for determination of the state of brain tissue at the
25. Id. at 1091, 78 So.2d at 184.
26. 227 La. 387, 79 So.2d 91 (1955).
27. Id. at 395, 79 So.2d at 495.
28. 227 La. 609, 80 So.2d 93 (1955).
29. LA. R.S. 13:3663 (1950).
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time of making the two wills in question. The court found that
all employees of an opponent are not comprehended within the
meaning of the statute and that, certainly, domestic servants are
not "particular agents." Exhumation was also properly dis-
allowed by the judge as no evidence of paresis had been shown
at the time of request and, moreover, had examination revealed
paresis at the time of death, this fact alone would not have proved
lack of testamentary capacity.
In Succession of Roth ° a question was raised concerning
the validity of a certain paragraph of an olographic testament
as having been written at a later time than the rest of the will,
and the use of tests to determine physical and chemical tests to
determine the issue. Since the basic issues in the case were pro-
cedural in nature, it is discussed more fully in the procedure
section of this Symposium.3
COkI MUNITY PROPERTY
In Succession of Helis 32 the decedent's estate consisted en-
tirely of community property. The testamentary executor quali-
fied and administered the community as a whole. This adminis-
tration was said to have been necessary only in order to estimate
inheritance taxes and hence the executor charged all costs of
administration, including his fee and those of attorneys, to the
decedent's share of the community. The tax collector maintained
that only half of these costs should have been deducted from
decedent's share of the community and that some eight thousand
dollars more was due in taxes. The court distinguished the cases
cited in support of the collector's position, found the gen-
eral rule correct, but agreed with the executor in this instance,
since no need for administration was present except to estimate
taxes. Two dissenting opinions appear in regard to the excep-
tion to the general rule of charging but half of the administra-
tion costs to the decedent's share. The widow was said to have
had the benefit of the administration consisting at least of having
her portion estimated and placed in her hands free of all debt.
30. 227 La. 1058, 81 So.2d 394 (1955).
31. See page 379 infra.
32. 226 La. 133, 75 So.2d 221 (1054). For a discussion of the tax aspects of
the case, see page 319 infra.
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Moreover, one justice was doubtful that so large an estate could
have been properly settled in any case without an administration.
In opposition to the final account of the administatrix of
the estate of deceased, in Succession of Siren,3 his daughter by
a previous marriage, the curatrix of his interdicted widow, main-
tained that a debt was owed. The deceased had bought and
mortgaged certain property preceding his second marriage and
this indebtedness had been paid during the second community.
The court held that the community owed the separate estate this
amount and the widow should receive a credit of one-half of it.
The lower court had recognized the widow as a creditor to be
paid from the mass of the estate, which would have reduced the
share of the community due to the widow.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
There was presented to the court in Amato v. Latter & Blum,
Inc.' the novel question of whether a real estate agent who with-
holds from the owner of listed property an offer to buy it and
thereby induces him to sell at a lower figure to another buyer
violates a legal duty owed to the prospective purchaser. The lat-
ter brought suit for damages based on the difference between
the offer submitted and the price put on the property by the
party who bought it. The trial court upheld an exception of no
cause of action and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court
reversed. It found that the broker owed the prospective pur-
chaser a duty to communicate the offer'to the owner. This was
based on the proposition that R.S. 37:1432-54 regulating the
business of real estate brokerage and requiring real estate
brokers to give a bond, constitute a legislative recognition that
real estate brokerage is a business affected with a public inter-
est. Justice Hamiter dissented, finding no basis in the legislation
for the existence of a duty in the agent to the prospective pur-
chaser.2 Beyond the question of statutory construction it is in-
teresting to speculate whether relief might have been granted'on
33. 226 La. 687, 77 So.2d 5 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 537. 79 So.2d 873 (1955).
2. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Note, 16 LoUtsrANA LAw RE-
vrsw 447 (1956).
